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Case No. 20090882-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.

Charles Moa,
Defendant/ Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate cases. The case numbers are
031903971 and 071904352. For convenience, the State will refer to them as case 3971
and case 4352. The State will cite to the records as R. 3971 at

and R. 4352 at

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On August 27,2009, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its ruling in this case.
That ruling is published as State v. Moa, 2009 UT App 231, 220 P.3d 162.
(Addendum A). On January 28,2010, this Court granted Defendant's petition for a
writ of certiorari. (Addendum B). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West 2008).

.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted review of two issues:
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner failed to
demonstrate plain error in the acceptance of his guilty plea as to district court case
number 031903971."
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's
imposition of consecutive sentences."
Standard of Review. "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the district court. The court of appeals' decision is reviewed
for correctness." State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, If 8, 147 P.3d 425 (quotations and
citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004), Utah Code Annotated § 76-10508 (West 2004), and Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-501 (West 2004) are included in
Addendum C.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Case 39711
On April 4, 2003, Defendant and several friends approached a group of
people in an Office Max parking lot, told them that the ''area was Glendale TCG
(Tongan Crip Gang) territory/' pulled out handguns, and fired several shots at the
group as they ran away. R. 3971 at 112:3. One witness later said that "the shooters
appeared to be shooting randomly towards the crowd and towards the ground." R.
3971 at 112: 3. Another witness told police that he heard approximately nine
gunshots. R. 3971 at 112:3. A bullet struck one of the bystanders in the calf. R. 3971
at 112: 3. Officers later learned that this victim had recently had problems with
Defendant over a girl they both had dated. R. 3971 at 112: 3.
Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, all second
degree felonies. R. 3971 at 1-3. The information alleged that the crimes were subject
to the gang enhancement in Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1 (2003). R. 3971 at 13. If convicted as charged, Defendant faced prison sentences of 5-to-life on each
count. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (3)(d) (2003).
1

The underlying facts are taken from the PSI. R. 3971 at 112. Defendant did
not challenge those facts at sentencing, R. 3971 at 234:29-30, and he has accordingly
waived the opportunity to do so on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (b)
(West 2004); State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994).
3

After being booked into jail, Defendant fled the state. R. 3971 at 4,112: 4.
During the next three years, Defendant was charged with assault in Washington in
November 2003, obstruction of justice and vandalism in California in May 2005,
assault in Washington in June 2005, and possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute in California in November 2006. R. 3971 at 112: 6-7.
Defendant was eventually rearrested and brought to Utah to face his
aggravated assault charges. R. 3971 at 112: 4. After Defendant's first two public
defenders were conflicted out, attorney James Valdez entered a notice of
appearance. R. 3971 at 41. Valdez negotiated a plea agreement with the State. R.
3971 at 226: 5; 227: 11. Under its terms, Defendant agreed to plead no contest to
discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony under Utah Code
Annotated § 76-10-508 (2003). In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a
suspended sentence of 0-to-5 years in prison, and the State also agreed not to bring
any additional charges stemming from this shooting. R. 3971 at 227: 4,12.
Valdez filled out a plea affidavit in anticipation of the plea hearing. R. 3971 at
75-82; see also R. 3971 at 227: 10-11, 15. Before that hearing was held, however,
Defendant wrote a letter to the court asking for new counsel. R. 3971 at 59-61.
Valdez then filed a motion to withdraw, and on April 24, 2007, Manny Garcia
appeared as successor counsel. R. 3971 at 55, 63. After entering his appearance,
4

'Garcia reviewed the plea affidavit and discussed it with Valdez, R. 3971 at 227:12,
-Garcia then met with Defendant, "specifically addressing Ine charge of ai^narging
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the sentencing hearing while a PSI was prepared; in exchange, the State agreed that
Defendant could be released from jail that day, rather than serving an additional 21

5

days in jail. R. 3971 at 227: 12-14. After Garcia discussed these alterations with
Defendant, Defendant agreed to the amended deal. R. 3971 at 227:13-14.2
On May 25, 2007, Defendant appeared in court to enter his plea. R. 3971 at
226:1-15. The parties first confirmed that Defendant was pleading no contest to a
third degree felony of unlawfully discharging a firearm, specifically identifying
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 as the charge. R. 3971 at 226:1-2, 5, 8.
The discussion then turned to the specific variant of the crime at issue. When
a person unlawfully discharges a firearm, the crime is ordinarily a class B
misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(1). But if the crime occurs under one
of the three circumstances set forth in § 76-10-508(2)(a) to -(c), it becomes a third
degree felony. Here, the parties informed the court that Defendant's plea was to a
third degree felony because he was admitting to having fired shots "toward a
building." R. 3971 at 226: 2, 6. The "toward a building" variant of this crime is set

2

The change in the recommended suspended sentence appears to have also
been an effort to correct an error in the original agreement. Specifically, while a
third degree felony ordinarily carries a prison sentence of 0-5 years, unlawfully
discharging a firearm requires a minimum of three years in prison. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2) (2003). Thus, the original
agreement was incorrect when it called for a suspended sentence of 0-to-5 years,
rather than 3-to-5 years. The prosecutor recognized this before the change in plea,
and he accordingly requested that this change be set forth in the amended
agreement. See R. 3971 at 226: 9; 3971 at 227:15.
6

forth n; L tan Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b), and occurs when "the actor, with intent
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discharges a firearm, i.-; .ne uucaiuii ^; an\ o ^ d i n g .

- p ! : - c v 'v.''

/:^v-n-'

'" - n - ' - . " - ^

.

^ <*

..lis case, the parties

:

^:tri—artiesdidnot

refer to the specific requirement that the crime occur with an intent to "intimidate or
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One week after the plea hearing, the State filed charges against Defendant for
witness tampering stemming from his conduct during a pretrial hearing in case
3971. : \ . . ; ^ i u i .

<• -..I

'.^'J

a ICJ ia ie aisu iueu uiarges against Defendant

for his participatioi i in tl i..e di i ve-by shooting at issue incase 435.2 R 4.35,2 at 2 5».J
1

"Ver \hj course o! the nr^ t month, 1 Meiidani UTOIP t our pro se letters to the

court asking for leave to withdraw his plea in case 3971. R. 3971 at 101. In his

J

The facts surrounding case 4352 are set forth in more detail below,
7

letters, Defendant offered two reasons for withdrawing his plea. R. 3971 at 101-09.
First, he claimed that the State had violated the plea agreement by filing the witness
tampering charge; and second, Defendant claimed that he had not approved the
alterations to the plea agreement that resulted in his immediate release from jail. R.
3971 at 101-09. Defendant did not mention any concern with rule 11 in any of those
letters, nor did he ever express confusion over the elements of the crime to which he
had pleaded. R. 3971 at 101-09.4
Garcia subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. R. 3971 at 107-08.
Robin Ljunberg then appeared as counsel and filed a motion to withdraw
Defendant's plea. R. 3971 at 124-28. In that motion, Defendant again claimed that
his plea was invalid because of the alterations to the plea and the witness tampering
charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. As in the pro se letters, Defendant did not express any
concern over rule 11 or the elements of the charge. R. 3971 at 127-28.
Although the State did not concede that the witness tampering charge had
actually violated the plea agreement, the State ultimately agreed to drop the charge.
R. 3971 at 140; 227: 6-7; 234: 20.

4

Defendant later offered an additional reason when speaking with the PSI
investigator, telling him that "he is going to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial
because he believes he can beat this case." R. 3971 at 112: 4.
8

On October 5, 20C7, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant's motion to
withdraw his -*••

7 3971 at 77" 1 ? '
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arguments in his own remarks. When asked about the witness tampering charge,
however, defense counsel admitted that those charges had already been dismissed
and were not a basis for withdrawing the plea. R. 3971 at 227; 6.
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niea wa=> char -ed." R. 3971 at 227: 7.

Defense counsel responded; ""That's correct, your Honor.
allegation that Mr. Moa made to nv." K - H

! 227- "

That was never an
" m i - . e d on" that

stipulation, the prosecutor called Garcia to the stand and questioned turn about d :e
sole claim still at issue; whether Deiei tdai n had iippi oved the alterations to the pled

In his testimony, Garcia testified that he had discussed the original agreement
with Defendant before the plea hearing, "specifically addressing the charge of
discharging a firearm " R. 3971 at 227:1 2. Garcia then explained that Defendant
9

had "attempted] to change" the original agreement because he "wanted to get out
of jail that day." R. 3971 at 227:12-13. According to Garcia, Defendant's desire to be
released that day was "the only reason this changed." R. 3971 at 227:17.
Following this testimony, the attorneys argued the merits of the motion. The
prosecutor argued that because Defendant had stipulated that there had been no
rule 11 violation, the court should enforce the resulting presumption that the plea
was knowing and voluntary. R. 3971 at 227:18. In response, defense counsel again
confirmed that Defendant was not arguing that rule 11 had been violated. R. 3971 at
227:19. Specifically, counsel again acknowledged that "Mr. Moa has never alleged
that you didn't follow Rule 11 in this case." R. 3971 at 227: 19. Instead, counsel
argued that withdrawal was appropriate because Moa had not approved the
changes to the plea agreement. R. 3971 at 227:19.
The court subsequently entered a written finding that the parties had
"stipulated that the plea... was taken in compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure." R. 3971 at 195. The court also concluded that as a matter of
law, Defendant's plea was "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." R.
3971 at 196. The court accordingly denied Defendant's motion. R. 3971 at 195-97.

10

Case4352 5
After being released from ir:1 ;~ case ,.:•-, i ,-.,•
occurred, Uerendant was involved inanothe: >;'
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began ^ho<>tin<; H* I hnmc Tv 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers later found several bullet holes
in a vehicle that was parked outside that home. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4,
Two citizens saw the shooting, and one of them followed Defendant as he left
the neighborhood. R. 4352 at PSI: \

bsequently joined the pursu,.
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^.vDuring

'he

i l i ^ D>-'^ndr--v Intentionally crashed head-on into one of the patrol vehicles and
sped w! w?y. R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers eventually forced Defendant off the road by
using the "pit maneuver." R. 4352 at PSI: 3. 6

5

The PSI in case 4352 is located in a non-paginated manila folder. As with the
PSI in case 3971, Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the facts contained in
this PSI before sentencing, and those facts are accordingly accepted as true. The
State will cite to it as R. 4352 at PSI: _ .
* ' A pit maneuver "is a method used by police to force a pursued vehicle to
abruptly turn sideways to the direction of 'travel, by bumping the back side of
the pursued vehicle with the police vehicle, causing the fleeing driver to lose
control and stop. 'PIT' stands for either 'Precision Immobilization Technique/
'Pursuit Intervention Technique,'" or 'Parallel Immobilization Technique/
11

After his vehicle was stopped, Defendant fled on foot. R. 4352 at PSI: 4.
Defendant ignored officers' commands to stop, and officers had to taser him twice
before they were able to subdue and arrest him. R. 4352 at PSI: 4.
Defendant was charged with seven counts of discharging a firearm from a
vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, one count of failing to respond to an
officer's commands, and one count of failing to stop at an officer's command. R.
4352 at 2-5. On November 13, 2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of
discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and one count
of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 4352 at 73-74.
Defendant was sentenced on January 11,2008. R. 4352 at 122:1-7. During the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor offered "to give a little bit of background as to
what occurred at this home." R. 4352 at 122:5. The prosecutor explained that there
had been a shooting at the same home earlier in the year in which a young girl had
been hit. R. 4352 at 122: 5. The prosecutor further explained that "[t]here's not just
one victim in this case. This is a whole neighborhood who had multiple shootings,
and finally got Mr. Moa because the citizens were willing to step up and put their
own lives in danger." R. 4352 at 122: 6. After relating the facts of the shooting at

depending on the police department using it." United States v. Bazaldua, 506 F.3d
671, 673 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
12

issue here, the prosecutor argued that Defendant is "extremely dangerous." R. 4 ° " n
at 122: 6, Defendant did not object to anv of these statements.
The coun jicn sentenced uduiiwu..; :o pi^u.;, . : JLI.IIU .
wouic neconse^u:.
nugr/
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r

• • -\ 4 -v>i refer to the prosecutor's comments

'

when explaining its sentence. Instead, the court simply stated that consecutive
sentences were appropriate because Defendant is' "an extreme danger to any
community that he happens to be in." R 4352 at 12.. >.
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In case 3971, Defendant argued that the triaK^urt violated ru'e 11 hv failing
to ensure that he understood all of the elements before accepting his plea, J d. at
f 13. According to Defendant, he was not informed that one ul the elements J1

or harass another." U1, M %]\ 10, 15-16. Defendant acknowledged that this claim was
unpreserved, but argued that the violation was plain error. Id. at % 1 3.
The court of appeals agreed with Defendant that the trial court had obviously
erred in accepting his plea. Specifically, the court noted tl tat the ' £ nil elements of
13

the third-degree felony to which Moa was pleading were not referenced or clarified
anywhere in the colloquy or plea statement/' and it accordingly concluded that
Defendant's plea was unknowing and involuntary. Id. at %f 14-15. But the court of
appeals then concluded that Defendant had not shown that this error "actually
affected the outcome of the plea process." Id. at ^ 17. As a result, the court rejected
his plain error claim. Id.
In case 4352, Defendant argued that the trial court had considered several
allegedly inappropriate comments from the prosecutor as part of its decision to
order consecutive sentences. Id. The court of appeals rejected this argument,
concluding that Defendant had failed to show that the trial court had actually relied
on those statements. Id. at ^f 20.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: First, this Court should decline Defendant's request to review the
alleged rule 11 violation because Defendant expressly stipulated that there had been
no rule 11 error during the proceedings below. As a result of this stipulation,
Defendant's rule 11 claim is barred by the invited error doctrine. In any event, even
if this claim were properly before this Court, Defendant's claim fails. Settled
precedent establishes that rule 11 compliance is not constitutionally required. Thus,
the alleged rule 11 violation did not obviously render his plea unconstitutional.
14

Second, Defendant has not shown that his plea w as obviously unknowing or
involuntary. As a result of Defendant's rule 11 stipulation, this Court must presume
that Defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary

Undti bettlnJ Unikil SLih i

Supreme Court precedent,, llJIhr- < mill III.J\ 111« «» i iiesun > that it h asl onv nt
Defendant' c ' ^ > »homeys informed 1 iim i »f the elements of the crime during their
-; - ~:<r•$ discussions. Moreover, Defendant was repeatedly informed of the specific
subsection at issue, and his counsel later testified that he had specifically discussed
the "charge" with Defendant. The trial court therefore did not obviously err when it
accepted his plea.
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was not ""ejudicial.

To show prejudice,

Defendant must show that he would not have entered this plea but for the alleged
error. But in this case, the record shows that Defendant accepted the plea agreement
because it allowed him to escape three potential life sentences and be released fi om
j a A in a t a a y. A . mough D t:: -a; ; U ^;;;

^ ggests that 1 le \ voi lid not have admitted to

trying to intimidate someone, the record does not support 'this claim. Instead, that
claim is directly contracted by Defendant's admissions in this case, as well as his
extensive history of violent behavior.
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Point II: The court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences in case 4352. Defendant
not only pleaded guilty to being the driver in a residential shooting, but also to
committing aggravated assault against a police officer who was involved in the
subsequent pursuit. When coupled with Defendant's extensive criminal history, the
trial court justifiably concluded that Defendant is a danger to the community. As a
result, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE BARS DEFENDANTS
PLAIN ERROR CLAIM IN CASE 3971. EVEN IF REACHED,
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS'
CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO PLAIN ERROR,
To show plain error, Defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred
which "should have been obvious to the trial court/' and (2) that "the error was
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993).
In his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court violated rule 11 when it
accepted his plea, and he then claims that this error rendered his plea unknowing
and involuntary. Pet. Br. 14. This Court should not consider Defendant's rule 11
claim, however, because Defendant invited any error when he stipulated that there
16

had been no rule 11 violation during the proceedings below. In addition, any error
did not obviously render his plea unconstitutional, given that rule 11 compliance is
not constitutionally required.
With respect to the underlying issue of whether Defendant's plea was
unknowing or involuntary, the court of appeals was incorrect when it concluded
that Defendant obviously did not understand the elements of the crime prior to
entering his plea. But even if there were obvious error, the court of appeals
correctly rejected Defendant's claim because Defendant has not shown prejudice.
A. This Court should not consider Defendant's rule 11 claim because
he invited any error. In any event, any alleged rule 11 error did not
obviously render Defendant's plea unconstitutional.7
Defendant argues that the Constitution requires trial courts to "ensure that
pleas are knowing and voluntary" by "strictly comply[ing] with rule 11/' Pet. Br.
14. He then argues that because the trial court did not comply with rule 11 when it
took his plea, his plea was unconstitutional. Id. This Court should reject this claim.

7

In its brief to the court of appeals, the State argued that Defendant's rule 11
claim was barred by the doctrine of invited error. See generally Aplee. Br. 22-25. The
court of appeals did not address this argument in its opinion. See generally Moa,
2009 UT App 231, I f 5-17. But it is well-settled that this Court can affirm a decision
below on any ground that is apparent on the record. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT
28, \ 13, 234 P.3d 1100; Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995).
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1. Defendant's rule 11 claim is barred by the invited error
doctrine.
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in
order to preserve an issue for appeal/' State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551.
Absent such an objection, this Court reviews an unpreserved claim only if the party
" articulate[s] an appropriate justification for appellate review/7 such as plain error
or exceptional circumstances. Id. "But under the doctrine of invited error," this
Court declines "to engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no
objection." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quotations and citation
omitted). This "arises from the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error." Id. at ^f 15. It also "discourage[es] parties from intentionally misleading the
trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. Thus,
where counsel "confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection" or
"fail[s] to object . . . when specifically queried by the court," the invited error
doctrine bars plain error review. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,110,86 P.3d 742.
Here, Defendant repeatedly waived any rule 11 claim during the proceedings
below. At the hearing on his motion to withdraw, his counsel twice informed the
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court that Defendant had "never" claimed that there had been a rule 11 violation. R.
3971 at 227: 7, 19. In accordance with this, his counsel expressly limited his
argument to the allegation that the plea alterations had rendered the plea invalid. R.
3971 at 227:19. Based on Defendant's representations, the trial court later found
that Defendant had "stipulated that the plea ... was taken in compliance with Rule
11." R. 3971 at 195.
Defendant's rule 11 stipulation dramatically altered the ability of the State to
respond to this claim. As noted, Manny Garcia — the attorney who had represented
Defendant during the final plea negotiations — testified at the evidentiary hearing.
At the outset of her examination of Garcia, the prosecutor confirmed that there was
no rule 11 challenge. As a result of Defendant's rule 11 stipulation, the prosecutor
limited her questioning to the issue of the plea alterations, rather than an addressing
any issues regarding Defendant's understanding of the rights covered in rule 11.
See generally R. 3971 at 227: 10-20. Had Defendant raised his rule 11 claim at that
time, the prosecutor could have created a record about those issues, such as by
asking Garcia to describe his conversations with Defendant regarding the elements
of the amended charge. But, as a direct result of Defendant's stipulation, those
questions were never asked.
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In short, Defendant's unpreserved claim ultimately relies on an evidentiary
gap that he created. The invited error doctrine therefore precludes review of
Defendant's rule 11 claim.
2. Rule 11 is a rule of procedure, not constitutional law. As a
result, a rule 11 violation does not obviously render a plea
unconstitutional.
Even if reached, however, the alleged rule 11 violation did not obviously
render Defendant's plea unconstitutional.
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether compliance with rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is constitutionally required. The Court first
explained that due process requires that a plea be knowing and voluntary. Id. at
465-66. But while the Court acknowledged that rule 11 is "designed to assist the
district judge in making" that determination, the Court refused to hold that rule 11
compliance is, itself, "constitutionally mandated." Id.
The Court reaffirmed this holding later that same term in Halliday v. United
States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969). The Court explained that it had taken "care [mMcCarthy]
to note that our holding was based solely upon the application of Rule 11 and not
upon constitutional grounds." Id. at 832. The Court thus noted that a "large
number of constitutionally valid convictions . . . may have been obtained without
20

full compliance with Rule 11." Id. at 833. Ten years later, the Court reemphasized
that "a violation" of rule 11 is "neither constitutional nor jurisdictional." United
States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979).
The reason for this distinction is, in part, structural. Unlike the Constitution,
rules of procedure are subject to routine alteration. Utah's rule 11, for example, has
been amended eight times since 1993. See Utah R. Crim. Proc. 11, adv. cmte. notes.
But routine alterations to a rule of procedure are not binding as a matter of
constitutional law. In United States v. Mercado, 349 F.3d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 2003), for
example, the Second Circuit accordingly rejected a claim that rule 11 violations are
considered to be constitutional violations, explaining that "changes to the Rule do
not create new constitutional rights."
In Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993), this Court similarly recognized
that rule 11 compliance is not constitutionally mandated. In that case, Salazar had
pleaded guilty to murder. Id. at 989. After he failed to file a timely motion to
withdraw his plea, he sought post-conviction relief, claiming that the plea was
unconstitutional because of a rule 11 violation. Id. at 989-90. This Court rejected
that claim, concluding that while there might have been a rule 11 violation, there
had not been a constitutional violation. Id. at 991-93. Relying in part on McCarthy,
this Court explained that there is a difference between the constitutional standard
21

and rule l l ' s requirements. Id. at 991. Thus, while rule 11 is designed to "protect
the [ ] rights" that are set forth in the Constitution, "a failure to comply with Utah's
rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States Constitution." Id.
This Court recently reaffirmed that distinction in Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90,
If 19, 173 P.3d 842. There, this Court held that a post-conviction petitioner was
required to "establish not just that the trial court violated rule 11," but also that "she
did not, in fact, enter her pleas in a knowing and voluntary way." And in State v.
Visser, 2001 UT App 215,117,31 P,3d 584, the court of appeals likewise explained
that the defendant's rule 11 claim was "distinct" from his "due process claim that
the plea was not knowing and voluntary."
In short, the "prophylactic provisions of rule 11" are designed to ensure that
a defendant's constitutional rights are protected, but those provisions are not
constitutional rules in and of themselves. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Instead, the
Constitution requires only that a plea be knowing and voluntary. Id. Defendant is
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therefore incorrect when he claims that the trial court violated his constitutional
rights by failing to comply with rule ll. 8
In response, Defendant suggests that a rule 11 violation provides a basis for
withdrawing a plea under State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (1987), and its progeny.
Pet. Br. 28-29. Defendant is incorrect.
In Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-14, this Court held that trial courts must comply
with rule 11 before accepting a plea. Relying on Gibbons, subsequent Utah decisions
held that a defendant can withdraw a guilty plea if the trial court did not strictly
comply with rule 11. See, e.g., State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f f 14-19,114 P.3d 569;
State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,1f| 21-25,26 P.3d 203; State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, H 1 0 12, 22 P.3d 1242; State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995).
As noted above, however, the United States Supreme Court and this Court
have both repeatedly held that rule 11 compliance is not constitutionally required.

* In State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48, f f 42,69,70,78,81,661 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, this
Court suggested in dicta that a rule 11(e) violation renders a plea unknowing and
involuntary. This dicta, in effect, equates the constitutional and rule 11 standards.
But Lovell did not suggest that it intended to depart from this Court's contrary
holdings in Salazar and Bluemel Indeed, in a footnote, Lovell, expressly stated that it
was not resolving whether the knowing and voluntary standard in the plea
withdrawal statute was the same standard as the prior good cause provision. Id.
f 47 n.5. On August 23, 2010, the State filed a petition for rehearing asking the
Court to remove the dicta equating the two standards. That petition is still pending.
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This Court has since specifically stated that Gibbons did not set forth a constitutional
requirement. See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. To the contrary, this Court has recognized
that the "right to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea" is "a right without express
constitutional protection" that is only "granted by statute." State v. Merrill, 2005 UT
34,t125 / 45 / 114P.3d585.
When properly viewed as a statutorily-based decision, Defendant's reliance
on Gibbons and its progeny is unavailing. And the reason for this is that the plea
withdrawal statute has been substantively modified since Gibbons was issued.
The statutory standard for withdrawing a plea is set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 7743-6 (West 2004). Prior to 2003, this statute allowed a defendant to
withdraw a plea for "good cause." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004),
Historical and Statutory Notes. Utah courts had historically interpreted this
standard to include rule 11 violations. See, e.g., State v. Penman, 964 P2d 1157,1160
(Utah App. 1998); State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995); State v.
Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 n.l (Utah App. 1994).
In 2003, however, the Utah Legislature removed the "good cause" provision
from § 77-13-6 and replaced it with the constitutional standard. Specifically, the
statute was rewritten to state that a plea can be withdrawn "only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code
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Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The 2003 amendment thus expressly
incorporated the constitutional standard —i.e. the knowing and voluntary
standard — as the sole basis for withdrawing a plea. This is significant, given that a
rule 11 violation does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. See Salazar, 852
P.2d at 992 (explaining that the knowing and voluntary standard is "more limited
[in] scope" that rule 11).
Importantly, the legislative history behind the 2003 amendment shows that
the Legislature specifically intended to remove rule 11 as a basis for withdrawing a
plea. When the bill was introduced to the Utah House of Representatives, its
sponsor explained that
[t]he current statute permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea only upon
good cause shown.... What the constitution requires is that the plea
be made knowingly and voluntarily, and rule 11 should actually create
a safe harbor and not be the standard by which withdrawal is
determined. [H.B.] 238 would correct some problems by permitting
defendants to withdraw their pleas only on a showing that the plea
was not knowing and voluntary.
Representative Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature,
February 28, 2003, audio file located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/
index.asp?House=H.
When the bill was introduced to the Senate, its Senate sponsor specifically
explained that the amendment was intended to ensure that rule 11 could no longer
25

serve as the basis for withdrawing a plea. According to its sponsor, rule 11 requires
a judge to "recite all of the rights that a defendant would give up if the defendant
were to plead guilty," but "the only thing the constitution requires is that a plea be
made knowingly and voluntarily. Hence, the statute itself will be changed to
simply show that the court may allow a defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon
a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Senator David
Gladwell, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, March 4,2003, audio file
located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=S. 9
*****

In short, the United States Supreme Court and this Court have both expressly
held that rule 11 violations are not constitutional violations. And although older
versions of the plea withdrawal statute allowed for withdrawal based on a rule 11
violations, the statute that was in effect at the time of this plea did not. Instead,
under the law that was in effect at the time of Defendant's plea, he could only
withdraw a guilty plea by showing that the plea was unknowing or involuntary.

9

Significantly, this amendment passed both houses unanimously—with votes
of 63-0-12 in the House of Representatives, and 27-0-2 in the Senate. See
http://le.utah.gov/~2003/status/hbillsta/hb0238.htm.
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Defendant therefore cannot show that there was an obvious error based on any
violation of rule 11. Defendant's rule 11 claim accordingly fails.
B. The record does not support Defendant's claim that he obviously
did not know the elements of the crime at issue.
Although primarily basing his argument on the alleged rule 11 violation,
Defendant also argues that his plea was also unknowing and involuntary. This
claim is unpreserved, however, so Defendant again argues plain error. On appeal
below, the court of appeals agreed with Defendant, concluding that the plea was
obviously unknowing and involuntary because Defendant was not informed that
the unlawfully discharging a firearm from a vehicle includes, as an element, the
"intent to intimidate or harass another." Moa, 2009 UT App 231, ^ 13-15. This
Court should overturn that conclusion.
As noted, this claim only succeeds if the alleged error "should have been
obvious to the trial court." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. When considering this claim,
the court "is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the petitioner
received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea/' Salazar, 852 P.2d at 993;
accord Visser, 2000 UT 88,112; Jolivet v. Cook 784 P.2d 1148,1150 (Utah 1989).
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As noted above, the knowing and voluntary standard requires that a plea be
knowing and voluntary. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465-66. Under this standard, a
defendant must be informed of the elements of the crime prior to entering his plea;
but this particular requirement can be satisfied when a defendant is informed of the
elements by his attorney, even if that occurs privately. In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545
U.S. 175,183 (2005), for example, the Supreme Court stressed that it has "never held
that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on
the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied
where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of
the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel/' In
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976), the Court similarly held that the
elements requirement can be satisfied through "either an explanation of the charge
by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of
the offense has been explained to the accused."
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also held that even when defense counsel
has not made "an express representation" that he explained the elements to the
defendant, it still "may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense
counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the
accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647.
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Thus, where "a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually
may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed
of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty." Bradshaw,
545 U.S. at 183. In addition, this Court has also held that if a trial court engages in a
rule 11 colloquy, that creates a presumption that the plea was knowing and
voluntary as well. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT12, % 22,26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44,111,1 P.3d 1108.
In this case, the plea colloquy and affidavit alone show that Defendant was
informed of all of the elements of the crime except one. Specifically, Defendant was
informed that he was pleading to having discharged a firearm within 600 feet of a
building, which satisfied the core requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10508(l)(a)(vii)(A), and also that he was admitting that he had fired shots "toward a
building," an apparent reference to the third degree felony enhancement set forth in
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508(2)(b). See R. 3971 at 76; 226: 2,4-6.
But the plea colloquy and affidavit do not explicitly state that Defendant acted
"with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable
structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). As noted, this omission provides the
basis for Defendant's claim.

But to show obvious error, Defendant must

demonstrate that the record as a whole demonstrates that he was unaware of this
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element before pleading. Contrary to the court of appeals7 conclusion, the record as
a whole actually demonstrates that Defendant was aware of this element on at least
five different levels.
First, Defendant was represented by counsel throughout this process —
initially by James Valdez, who negotiated the original deal, and then by Manny
Garcia, who negotiated the amended deal. As a result, this Court can "presume"
that Valdez, Garcia, or both "explained] the nature of the offense in sufficient detail
to give [Defendant] notice of what he [was] being asked to admit." Henderson, 426
U.S. at 647; accord Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183.
Second, Defendant repeatedly stipulated that there was no rule 11 error when
the issue was raised below. R. 3971 at 227: 7, 19. As a result of this stipulation, this
Court can presume that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Martinez, 2001UT12,
\ 22; Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, | 11. This is particularly true given the unique
circumstances at issue here, where Defendant was represented by counsel during a
plea withdrawal process, and where counsel then affirmatively stipulated that
Defendant was not claiming that there had been any rule 11 error. R. 3971 at 227: 7,
19. In a very real sense, this stipulation suggested that Defendant had understood
all of the rights set forth in rule 11 — which necessarily included the elements of the
crime. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A).
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Third, the record also shows that Defendant was informed of the specific
statute at issue—both in terms of its general code number, R. 3971 at 75-76; 3971 at
226: 6, as well as the specific variant at issue in this plea. R. 3971 at 226: 2. When
considering a similar claim, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that this puts a
defendant on notice of the elements of the crime. See United States v. Franklin, 547
F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) ("the citation to the statute. . . should have informed
Franklin about the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty").
Fourth, during the evidentiary hearing below, Garcia testified that he not only
discussed the general contours of the plea agreement with Defendant, but also that
he specifically discussed the crime itself. Specifically, Garcia explained that he had
"specifically address[ed] the charge of discharging a firearm" with Defendant
during their discussions. R. 3971 at 227:12.
Finally, in the plea affidavit itself, Defendant stated that he understood "the
nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)."
R. 3971 at 76. Though Defendant subsequently filed four pro se requests to
withdraw his plea and one motion through counsel, he never once suggested that he
did not know about or understand the elements of the crime at issue.
Given all of this, there is no reason to think that it should have been "obvious
to the trial court" that Defendant did not understand the elements of this crime.
31

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Defendant not only knew the charge at issue, but he also
knew the specific subvariant. Moreover, he had the opportunity to discuss this plea
agreement with two different attorneys prior to the plea colloquy, as well as with an
additional attorney during the plea withdrawal proceedings. In spite of this,
Defendant never claimed that he did not understand all of the elements of the crime
to which he pleaded, but instead repeatedly informed the court below that he
thought that rule 11 had been fully complied with.
Thus, taken as a whole, this record does not show that Defendant was
obviously uninformed of this element.

If reached, Defendant's claim should

therefore be rejected.10

Defendant also suggests that there was an insufficient factual basis to show
that he had an "intent to intimidate or harass another/ 7 Pet. Br. 19,25-26. But intent
can be proven through circumstantial evidence, State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784
(Utah 1992), and it can also be "inferred from the actions of the defendant or from
surrounding circumstances/' Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 43. Moreover, "a person is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts/' State v.
Sisneros, 631, P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981),
In his plea affidavit, Defendant admitted that he not only fired shots toward
the building, but also that he had fired them "toward the direction of people." R.
3971 at 76. One natural and probable consequence of firing a gun at people is that
those people will feel intimidated or harassed. Moreover, it is also reasonable to
infer that when a person intentionally fires a gun toward other people, that person
at least intended to intimidate or harass them.
In addition, the statute at issue is also satisfied if Defendant intended "to
damage a habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). In both the plea
colloquy and the plea affidavit, Defendant admitted that he "intentionally and
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C Even if there was error, it was harmless.
Although the court of appeals concluded that there had been obvious error
below, the court still rejected Defendant's plain error claim because he had not
shown that the alleged error "actually affected the outcome of the plea process."
Moa, 2009 UT App 231, f 17. The court of appeals was correct.
1. To prevail on his claim, Defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty
but for the error.
To prevail on a plain error claim, Defendant must also show that the obvious
error was "harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
In this case, however, Defendant claims that when a trial court fails to ensure
that a defendant knew the elements of the crime, the resulting "harm is selfevident." Pet. Br. 35. As a result, Defendant claims that he does not have to "prove
that he would have refused to enter his plea if he had been informed correctly of the
elements" to establish prejudice. Pet. Br. 38 (quotations and citation omitted).

knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building." R. 3971 at 76; 226: 6. One
natural and probable consequence of discharging a firearm toward a building is that
the building might be damaged. And when a person intentionally fires a gun at a
building, it is also reasonable to infer that the person intended to damage the
building. Defendant therefore has not shown any error, let alone obvious error.
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But this argument has already been rejected by this Court. In State v. Dean,
2004 UT 63, f Tf 16-23, 95 P.3d 276, the defendant argued that the trial court had
plainly erred when it failed to advise him of his constitutional rights before
accepting his plea. In considering whether any error was harmful, this Court noted
that in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, a defendant must show that
there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at f 22
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, a defendant in such cases "must show that
the alleged error 'affected the outcome of the plea process/" Id. at % 22 (quoting Hill
v. Locklwrt, 474 U.S. 52,59 (1985)). This Court then adopted that same standard for
cases in which a defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred during the plea
colloquy. In such cases, the defendant must show that, "but for the alleged error,
[the defendant] would not have pled guilty." Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
In State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, t 13, 189 P.3d 85, the court of
appeals applied this rule to the very claim at issue in this case. There, Diaz-Arevalo
claimed that the trial court failed to ensure that he knew all the elements of the
crime before accepting his plea. Id. After concluding that the trial court had
committed obvious error, the court of appeals found that the error was harmless. Id.
at Tf^f 14-15. Relying on Dean, the court of appeals held that when a defendant
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claims that he was not informed of the elements of the crime, he still must show that
"but for the alleged error, he or she would not have plead guilty/' Id. at f If 15-16.
Defendant is therefore incorrect when he claims that he does not have to show
individualized harm in this case. Instead, he can only prevail if he shows that the
alleged error actually affected this plea process — i.e. that he would not have entered
his plea but for the alleged error.11
2. Defendant has not shown harm in this case.
Turning to the facts of this case, Defendant claims that there is a "reasonable
probability" that he would not have accepted this plea if he had "been informed of
all the elements of the offense/' Pet. Br. 39. The record belies that assertion.
Defendant was initially charged with three counts of aggravated assault. R.
3971 at 1-3. The State also alleged that each of these counts was subject to the gang
enhancement. R. 3971 at 1-3. If convicted, Defendant was facing prison sentences of
5-to-life on each count. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(3)(d). In spite of this, Defendant's attorney was able to secure a plea
agreement in which Defendant could plead no contest to a third degree felony and
11

InLovell, 2010 UT 48, f ! 48-80, this Court held that harmless error review is
not applicable to rule 11 violations under the pre-2005 version of rule 11. As noted
above, however, this plea was taken after 2005. Thus, Lovell does not impact the
harmless error analysis in this case.
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be released from jail immediately without serving any time in prison. R. 3971 at 227:
4, 12. In assessing Defendant's claim of prejudice, the practical benefits that
Defendant received from the deal are significant.. In Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d
1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001), for example, the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim like
Defendant's, concluding that the defendant's decision to accept the "plea was based
on his belief that he would likely receive a more lenient sentence" under the deal
"than if he were to proceed to trial."

Under those circumstances, the court

"rationally inferred that the precise elements" of the crime at issue "were not
material to [the defendant] in making his plea." Id.
This is particularly true here, where the record shows that Defendant's
motivation for accepting this plea was directly tied to his immediate release from
jail.

During the plea hearing, for example, Defendant asked the court for

confirmation that "I'll be released today for sure?" R. 3971 at 226:14. And during
the subsequent evidentiary hearing, Manny Garcia explained that Defendant had
only agreed to the amended deal because he "wanted to get out of jail that day." R.
3971 at 227:12; see also R. 3971 at 227:13 ("He wanted to get out of jail that day and
so I went back and talked to Vince about what deal could we make so that he could
get out that day."). According to Garcia, Defendant was going to accept the original
deal "until he realized he wasn't going to get out that day and then that's when the
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deal changed/7 R. 3971 at 227:17. Thus, "the only reason [the deal] changed" was
Defendant's desire to get out of jail that day. R. 3971 at 227:17. And when the State
agreed to Defendant's immediate release, Defendant got "exactly what he was
anticipating/' because "his biggest concern . . . was he wanted to get out of jail."
R. 3971 at 234:17-18.
In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that he never raised this claim below,
Defendant now insists that he would not have taken this lenient deal if he had only
known that he was admitting to having tried to intimidate somebody. Pet. Br. 39.
The record simply does not support this claim. Defendant's prior criminal record
included multiple charges for assault, as well as charges for obstruction of justice,
robbery, theft, and interfering with arrest. R. 3971 at 112: 6. After fleeing the State
following his arrest on these very charges, Defendant continued his pattern of
violent crime. Between his arrest in this case and his return to Utah, he was charged
with assault in Washington in November 2003, obstruction of justice and vandalism
in California in May 2005, and assault in Washington in June 2005. R. 3971 at 112:67. And even after being jailed on these charges, Defendant continued to show a
pronounced proclivity toward violence and aggressive, intimidating behavior.
While awaiting resolution of these charges, he was charged with 13 different jail
violations, including fighting, using abusive language to jail staff, inciting other
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prisoners to disobey orders, using threatening language to other prisoners,
assaulting jail staff, disorderly conduct, and damage of jail property. R. 3971 at 112:
4-5. Indeed, even after accepting the terms set forth in this plea, Defendant engaged
in further acts of violence and intimidation. In case 4352, he drove a car during a
drive-by shooting in a residential neighborhood, and he then rammed a police car
during the subsequent high speed chase. R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Thus, Defendant's longstanding history belies his claim, instead showing that he has no reluctance at all
toward intimidation, aggression, and violence.
Defendant raises a number of arguments in preemptive response, all of which
are unavailing. First, Defendant points out that he asked the plea court whether he
could get a trial, and he then argues that this shows that he would not have pleaded
guilty had he known of the missing element. Pet. Br. 39. This assumes too much.
Although given the opportunity to do so at the plea hearing, Defendant did not ask
any questions about the elements of the crime. R. 3971 at 226:11. And even after
being informed that he could receive a trial if he rejected the plea agreement, he still
chose to accept it. Thus, while the record shows some concern over other aspects of
this plea, it shows no concern over the elements of the crime at the time f o this plea.
This is significant. In State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998), for example,
this Court held that a plea was knowing and voluntary even though the defendant
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had "exhibited moments of confusion during the plea-taking" and asked a series of
questions prior to entering his plea. No different result is required here.
Second, Defendant points to the fact that he filed a motion to withdraw his
plea. Pet. Br. 39. But while the record shows that Defendant was concerned about
his plea following the hearing, the record does not show that his concern had
anything to do with the elements of the crime. Defendant never mentioned the
elements in any of his four pro se letters, the motion to withdraw that he filed
through counsel, or in the evidentiary hearing itself. R. 3971 at 101-09. Instead, he
only complained about the witness tampering charge (which was subsequently
dropped), as well as the alterations to the plea agreement. R. 3971 at 101-06.
Finally, Defendant argues that because he expressed concern about this same
intent element when it arose in case 4352, this demonstrates that he would not have
accepted the plea in case 3971 if he had been properly informed of it. Pet. Br. 40.
But this argument also assumes too much.
In case 4352, Defendant was similarly charged with unlawful discharge of a
firearm. R. 4352 at 2-6. During the plea hearing in that case, Defendant admitted
that he was driving the car with a friend and that he "made a U-turn to shoot in
there." R. 4352 at 121: 9. Upon further questioning, however, Defendant denied
that the reason he had driven "over there with the guy with the gun was to
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intimidate somebody." R. 4352 at 121: 10. Defendant explained: "It wasn't to
intimidate. It was just discharge the firearm." R. 4352 at 121:11. When the trial
court then informed Defendant that it would "infer intimidation from that" and still
accept Defendant's plea, Defendant did not object. R. 4352 at 121:11. Instead, he
still agreed to plead guilty, R. 4352 at 121:11-12, and he has not raised that issue in
his appeal of that case.
Thus, what the record from case 4352 actually shows is that even when
Defendant was expressly informed of this same element in a different case, and even
when Defendant did express some concern about that element in that case, his
concern over that element was not strong enough to cause him to reject the State's
plea agreement and instead proceed to trial.
In short, the plea agreement in case 3971 allowed Defendant to avoid three
potential life sentences and instead be immediately released from jail. Although
Defendant now claims that he would have rejected this offer rather than ever
admitting that he tried to intimidate someone, his life history belies that claim.
Defendant is a known gang leader whose history of violence and intimidation both
pre-dates and post-dates this plea. Moreover, the record shows that Defendant did
not accept this deal because of a principled belief about which elements best fit his
crime. Rather, Defendant accepted this deal because it allowed him to receive
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exactly what he wanted: immediate release from jail. Having already received that
benefit, he should not be allowed to retroactively void the deal based on an alleged
error that had nothing to do with his decision to accept the deal in the first
instance — particularly where he repeatedly waived any claim regarding this exact
error during the proceedings below.
Defendant's plain error claim should be rejected.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT ORDERED DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES IN CASE 4352 TO
RUN CONSECUTIVELY.
A trial court's decision to order consecutive or concurrent sentences is
governed by Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Under § 76-3-401(2), a
court is required to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant" when making that decision.
In case 4352, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences. Moa, 2009 UT App 231, f 20.
Defendant challenges that conclusion on two bases. First, he argues that the trial
court based its decision on two allegedly improper comments from the prosecutor at
sentencing. Pet. Br. 47-50. Second, Defendant argues that it was an abuse of
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discretion to order consecutive sentences under State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998). Pet. Br. 45-47. Both claims should be rejected.
A- The record does not support Defendant's claim that the trial court
considered improper statements at sentencing.
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its
sentencing decision on two allegedly improper comments from the prosecutor. Pet.
Br. 47-50. In the first, the prosecutor stated that the "whole neighborhood" was the
victim of the drive-by shooting. R. 4352 at 122: 6. In the second, the prosecutor
referred to the fact that there had been a prior shooting at this same home earlier in
the year. R. 4352 at 122: 5.
As an initial matter, Defendant is incorrect when he claims that § 76-3-401's
reference to "the number of victims" could not include consideration of harm done
to the surrounding neighbors. Pet. Br. 47. It is well accepted that trial courts are
allowed to consider the injury that has been caused to "society" as part of a
sentencing decision See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 947 R2d 630, 644 (Utah 1997). And
this rule has been specifically extended to the decision whether to order consecutive
or concurrent sentences. See State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993).
Studies have shown that violent crimes such as this one can directly impact
the surrounding community in a number of ways. For example, violent crime
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drives down the property values in the surrounding neighborhood. See John R.
Hipp, et. al., Drive-bys and Trade-ups: Examining the Directionality of the Crime and
Residential Instability Relationship, 87(4) Social Forces 1782 (June 2009). And it also
increases the rates of juvenile delinquency and mental health disorders amongst
adolescents who live in the neighborhood. See generally Deborah Burdett Schiavone,
The Effects of Exposure to Community Violence on Aspects of Adolescent Identity
Development, 22 Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing 99 (May 2009);
Sarah Kelly, The Psychological Consequences to Adolescents of Exposure to Gang Violence
in tlie Community: An Integrated Review of the Literature, 23 Journal of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing 67, 69 (May 2010).
Nor was it inappropriate for the prosecutor to point out that these victims
had already been victimized by a prior shooting. As noted, § 76-3-401(2) allows a
court to consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses'' as part of its
consecutive/concurrent decision. Among others, the particular harm suffered by
these victims would certainly increase the "gravity" of this particular offense.
But more importantly, the court of appeals ultimately rejected Defendant's
claim on this issue because it concluded that Defendant had failed to show that
either comment actually influenced the trial court's sentencing decision. Moa, 2009
UT App 231, f 20. This conclusion was correct.
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It is well-accepted that a defendant bears the burden of establishing error
when he claims that the trial court improperly weighed the § 76-3-401(2) factors.
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Iff 11,16,40 P.3d 626; State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App
432, f 28,82 P.3d 1167. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, this burden is not met
when a defendant simply shows that the trial court was silent regarding a particular
factor. This Court has instead held that a trial court is not required to state on the
record "the extent to which it considered" each of the factors set forth in § 76-3-402.
Helms, 2002 UT 12, If110-11; accord State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, f 8,194 P.3d
195. Instead, sentences are affirmed as long as information regarding the contested
factor was properly before the trial court. Helms, 2002 UT 12, Iff 10-16; State v.
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997). Thus, if the record shows that the
factor was discussed in the PSI and that the trial court reviewed the PSI prior to
sentencing, that is sufficient to show that the trial court properly considered the
factor. See Helms, 2002 UT 1 2 , 1 1 3 ; Valdez, 2008 UT App 329,1 8.
Defendant cites to no statute or case that requires a trial court to specifically
delineate and then ''reject77 all testimony or "arguments 77 that it found to be
"inappropriate for consideration77 in the consecutive/concurrent analysis. Pet. Br.
50. This failure is particularly important here, where Defendant did not even object
to the statements that he now finds to be so objectionable. R. 4352 at 122: 5-6. As
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explained by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, the "failure of defense counsel to
object to statements made by a prosecutor during the closing is a matter to which we
attach significance/7 Commonwealth v. Leach, 901 N.E.2d 708,717 (Mass. App. 2009)
(quotations and citation omitted). "It is not only a sign that what was said sounded
less exciting at trial than appellate counsel now would have it seem, but it is also
some indication that the tone and manner of the now challenged aspect of the
prosecutor's argument were not unfairly prejudicial/7 Id.
Thus, while the trial court clearly heard the comments at issue, the court
never referred to them during the sentencing hearing. See generally R, 4352 at 122:17. Instead, the court stated that its sentencing decision was only based on its
conclusion that Defendant is an "extreme danger to any community that he happens
to be in.77 R. 4352 at 122: 6. Defendant's claim that these two comments had
anything to do with this decision is therefore unsupported by the record.
B. It was not an abuse of discretion to order consecutive sentences.
Defendant also claims that under the broader facts of this case, the decision to
order consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. But this Court has long
held that trial courts retain discretion over this decision. See Helms, 2002 UT12, 18.
In such cases, a trial court only abuses its discretion when "no reasonable [person]
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would take the view adopted by the trial court/' State v. Russell, 791 R2d 188,192
(Utah 1990); see also State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, If 12, 84 P.3d 854.
Here, the trial court offered only one explanation for its decision to order
consecutive decisions: that Defendant is "an extreme danger to any community that
he happens to be in," R. 4352 at 122: 6.12
The record amply supported this conclusion. In case 4352, Defendant
admitted that he was the driver during a drive-by shooting. R. 4352 at 121: 9.
Following the shooting, Defendant led officers on a high speed chase that reached
125 to 130 mph. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. During that chase, Defendant intentionally
rammed his car into a police car, and he was only stopped after officers performed
the pit maneuver on him. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Defendant then ran away, and officers
had to taser him twice in order to subdue him. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4.
While this crime alone showed that Defendant is an "extreme danger to any
community that he happens to be in," Defendant's criminal history amplified that
conclusion. R. 4352 at 122: 6. As set forth in the PSI, Defendant has been involved in
17 criminal incidents since 1997. R. 4352 at PSI: 6-7. In fact, his criminal history in

12

Though not raised as an issue on appeal, the State notes that this was
apparently a reference to Defendant's character, history, and rehabilitative potential,
all of which are appropriate factors for consideration under § 76-3-401(2).
46

Utah is serious enough that he was at one time officially listed as Public Enemy
Number One. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. In addition, Defendant was a fugitive from charges
in Washington state at the time of these incidents. R. 4352 at PSI: 6
Defendant's criminal proclivities have never been curbed by the threat of
incarceration. Defendant's involvement in this case occurred while awaiting
sentencing in case 3971. Once in jail, Defendant was repeatedly charged with
infractions. While awaiting resolution of case 3971, he was charged with fighting,
using abusive language to jail staff, inciting other prisoners to disobey orders, using
threatening language to other prisoners, assaulting jail staff, disorderly conduct, and
damage of jail property. R. 3971 at 112:4-5. And Defendant was charged with two
more rule violations while in jail awaiting resolution of case 4352, including
disorderly conduct and not following orders from jail staff. R. 4352 at PSI: 5.
Contrary to Defendant's claim, Galli does not mandate a different result. See
generally Pet. Br. 45-47. In Galli, this Court reversed two trial courts' imposition of
consecutive sentences because the courts had failed to "give[ ] adequate weight to
certain mitigating circumstances." Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. But Galli did not establish
a baseline rule that mandates reversal whenever the facts of a particular case
somehow seem less egregious. Rather, the statute itself makes it clear that the
decision whether to order consecutive or concurrent sentences is a case-specific one
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that turns on the particular facts of a particular case. Subsequent decisions have
accordingly limited Galli to its own facts. See, e.g., State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 67,52
P.3d 1210; Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 15; Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, If 24 n.7; State v.
Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, f 23,12 P.3d 103.
In any event, Defendant's comparison to Galli fails on its own terms. For
example, Defendant suggests that, "as in Galli, [his] case did not involve physical
harm or death to the victims/' Pet. Br. 46. But in Galli, the lack of harm was
intentional — Galli had only carried a pellet gun during his robberies, and he never
fired it during his crimes. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. Defendant, however, fired an
actual handgun at the crowd of people in case 3971, R. 3971 at 75-76, and his
companion also fired an actual gun at a home during the drive-by shooting at issue
in case 4352. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Following that shooting, Defendant led officers on
a high speed chase, after which Defendant rammed a police car in an effort to get
away. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Any of these intentional actions could have resulted in
injury or death to any number of bystanders. The fact that no one was killed was
the result of happenstance, not a deliberate choice by Defendant.
Defendant also suggests that, like Galli, his pleas show a willingness to accept
responsibility for his crimes. Pet. Br. 46. The record refutes this claim as well. After
entering his plea in case 3971, Defendant told the PSI investigator that he "was not
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there/ 7 "did not do this crime/' and thus had "no story to tell other than that/ 7 R.
3971 at 112: 3. Defendant was also "elusive77 and "uncooperative 77 during the
preparation of the PSI in that case; among others, he "appeared to lie about his
involvement in gangs, the current offense, his parole status, and his pending cases/ 7
R. 3971 at 112: 4.

Defendant similarly failed to accept responsibility when

interviewed for the PSI in case 4352. There, he did not directly admit that he drove a
car in a drive-by shooting; rather, he appeared to minimize his conduct, stating that
he "got into a car that a firearm was discharged from.77 R. 112: 4. And rather than
acknowledging that he rammed a police car during a high speed chase, he
suggested that he and the officer had simply lost control of their vehicles and
simultaneously "ran into the curb.77 R. 4352 at PSI: 4.13
The record also shows that Defendant's guilty pleas in both cases were not
selfless attempts at a full confession, but were instead negotiated deals that allowed
Defendant to avoid liability for extensive criminal conduct. In case 3971, initial
charges involving three first degree felonies (through the gang enhancement) were
reduced to a no contest plea to a third degree felony. And in case 4352, initial

13

The damage done to the two cars supports the officer's claim that this was
an intentional collision. Specifically, the rental car that Defendant was driving was
"totaled," and the police vehicles sustained $8,730 in damages. R. 4352 at PSI: 6.
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charges of nine separate third degree felonies and a class A misdemeanor were
reduced to guilty pleas to three third degree felonies. R. 4352 at 2-5, 73-74.
Finally, Defendant suggests that he is more amenable to leniency than Galli
because, unlike Galli, he "did not abscond for three years before sentencing." Pet.
Br. 46. With respect to this factor, the differences between Defendant and Galli
could not be more profound. After Galli fled from Utah, he moved to Minnesota,
during which time he "apparently obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a
productive individual." Galli, 867 P.2d at 938. When Defendant fled Utah in case
3971, however, he continued living a life of violent crime, incurring multiple assault
charges in Washington, as well as charges of obstruction of justice, drug dealing,
and vandalism in California. R. 3971 at 112: 6-7. And even with the threat of 3-to-5
years in prison hanging over his head in case 3971, Defendant did not stop
committing violent crime, as evidenced by his conduct in case 4352, as well as his
subsequent series of violent jailhouse incidents.
In short, Defendant is not an "immature young man who was afraid of being
caught." Pet. Br. 46. Rather, Defendant is a repeat offender with a long history of
violent crime. Given the violent nature of this offense, as well as Defendant's
extensive criminal history prior to and after this offense, the trial court was well
within its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
fl
This appeal encompasses two consolidated cases stemming from
separate drive-by shootings. In case no. 031903971 (case #3971),
Charles Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault.
Moa entered a no-contest plea to one count of discharging a
firearm toward a building but subsequently moved to withdraw his
plea. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Moa to a
prison term of three to five years. Moa appeals the trial
court's denial of his motion, alleging violations of both rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and constitutional
requirements, and essentially arguing that his plea was not
entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was not informed of
the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled.
\2
In case no. 071904352 (case #4352), Moa was charged with
seven counts of discharging a firearm toward a building, one
count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, one
count of aggravated assault, and one count of failure to stop.
Moa pleaded guilty to one count of discharging a firearm from a
vehicle, failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Moa to three to
five years on the discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five

years on the failure to respond to an officer's signal charge,
and zero to five years on the aggravated assault charge. All of
the sentences from this case and case #3 971 were to run
consecutively. Moa appeals the trial court's imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. We affirm in
both cases.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
%3
Moa raises two issues, one pertaining to each case. First,
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in case
#3 971 by denying his motion to withdraw his no-contest plea. "We
review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Holland,
921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, "[w]hether the trial court strictly complied with rule
11 is a question of law, reviewed for c o r r e c t n e s s . . . . The
trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear
error." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 9, 22 P.3d 1242 (citation
omitted). Moa concedes that this issue was not preserved and
asks us to consider it under either the plain error doctrine or
the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. Under the plain
error doctrine, we reverse where the defendant "establish[es]
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 15, 95
P.3d 276 (internal quotation marks omitted). Alternatively, we
review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a matter of
law. See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
In order for a defendant's Sixth Amendment
challenge to succeed, the defendant "must
show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable."
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)),
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Second, Moa argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in case #4352 by imposing consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences. "We afford the trial court wide latitude
in sentencing and, generally, will reverse a trial court's
sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge's
discretion." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 66, 52 P.3d 1210
(internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.

Withdrawal of No-Contest Plea

f5
We first consider whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Moa's motion to withdraw his no-contest
plea in case #3971.
f6
On April 4, 2003, Moa and two other individuals allegedly
discharged firearms toward three people in a business parking
lot. Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a
second degree felony. Moa was appointed an attorney, who
withdrew because of a conflict and new counsel was appointed. On
the day of his preliminary hearing, Moa alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel and moved to have yet another attorney
appointed. The trial court granted the motion, continued the
hearing, and appointed James Valdez. Weeks later, Valdez also
requested permission to withdraw on the basis of a conflict and
moved to continue the preliminary hearing. The trial court
granted this motion and appointed Manny Garcia. While
represented by Garcia, Moa entered a no-contest guilty plea to
one count of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third
degree felony.
i[7
At the plea hearing, the State clarified the written plea
agreement, stating that it would dismiss the three aggravated
assault charges, that Moa would be released that day, and that it
would recommend probation unless Moa failed to obtain a
presentence report: or committed any further crimes prior to
sentencing. The trial court made a few changes to the
information by interlineation and the State agreed to submit an
amended information reflecting the new charge, which it did two
and a half weeks later.
1(8
During the plea colloquy, the attorneys, trial court, and
Moa discussed Moa's charges. When asked for the factual
predicate for the charge, defense counsel stated "Judge,
apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party,
intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm coward a
building in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. That's what is
written down here as the element and the facts, Your Honor."
Although neither counsel readily recalled the code section under
20070940-CA
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which Moa was being charged, the plea
508 On or about 4/4/2003 defendant as
knowingly discharged a firearm from a
m [Salt Lake] County State of Utah."

affidavit states: "76-10a party intentionally and
vehicle toward [building]
(strikeout in original).

f9
The trial court repeatedly asked Moa if he understood the
charges and the procedure. Mca indicated that he did. Also,
defense counsel Garcia explained that prior counsel Valdez "had
already arranged this and I just reiterated it all and have gone
over it again with [Moa] and I believe that this is our
understanding of the deal." Moa agreed.
flO At the time Moa allegedly committed the crime, Utah Code
section 76-10-508 provided that it was a class B misdemeanor for
a person to "discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm
. . . within 600 feet of . . . a house, dwelling, or any other
building." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (1) (a) (vn) (A) , (2) (2003)
(amended 2008), Section 76-10-508 further provided that it was a
third degree felony with a minimum sentence of three years if the
actor discharged the firearm "with intent to intimidate or harass
another," Id. § 76-10-508(2)(b) (emphasis added). 2 The trial
court mistakenly informed Moa that a third degree felony was
punishable by zero to five years in the state prison, but the
attorneys corrected the court, and the court then correctly told
Moa that the offense was punishable by three to five years.
Neither the colloquy nor the plea affidavit referred to a
specific subsection of 76-10-508. Likewise, they did not include
subsection (2)(b)'s language, "with intent to intimidate or
harass another." The trial court also told Moa that if he were
convicted of the three original second-degree felony charges of
aggravated assault, and the sentences were ordered to run
consecutively, he "could be looking at 45 years." The trial
court accepted Moa's no-contest plea, ordered a pre-sentence
investigation (PSI) report, and ordered Moa released to Pretrial
Services.
Ill On May 31, 2007, the State moved to revoke Moa's pretrial
release because Moa did nou report to Pretrial Services. On Jane
9, 2007, the events leading to case #4352 occurred.
1|12 On June 15 and 22, 2007, Moa filed pro se motions to
withdraw his no-contest plea based on different issues than those
now raised on appeal. Subsequently, Garcia moved to withdraw and
was replaced with Moa's fifth attorney, Robin Lgungberg. At the
1. Section 76-10-508 was amended in 2 0 08. The quoted language
is now found in Utah Code section 76-10-508.1, winch outlines tne
penalties for a felony discharge of a firearm. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-508.1 (2008).
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hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Moa stipulated
there was full compliance with the provisions of rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. At that hearing, Garcia
testified that Valdez had prepared the plea affidavit and
described why the changes were made. The trial court denied
Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court's
written Findings of Fact included:
1. The parties stipulated that the plea
taken on May 25, 2007 was taken in compliance
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
3. The court finds Mr. Garcia to be a
credible witness.
4. The court finds that based on Mr. Moa's
physical demeanor and his responsiveness to
questions, Mr. Moa was aware of what was
happening during the proceedings.
5. The [c]ourt finds that all involved
parties took measures to ensure that Mr. Moa
understood what was occurring, especially in
light of the numerous changes in attorneys
that Mr. Moa had on this case.
The trial court concluded that "[t]he defendant's plea was
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made."
1|13 Moa now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his no-contest plea, asserting that the trial court
violated rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by
failing to ensure that Moa understood all the elements of the
crime, specifically the penalty-enhancing element of "intent to
intimidate or harass another." Rule 11 describes necessary
findings a trial court must make prior to accepting a guilty
plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11. Included in rule 11 are the
requirements that the court find that (1) "the defendant
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered" and (2) "there is a factual basis for the plea."
Id. R. 11(e)(4)(A)-(B). However, strict compliance with rule 11
is not constitutionally required. See Salazar v. Warden, 852
P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993) (discussing strict compliance and
concluding "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a
guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States
Constitution").2 " [T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure
2,
Although Salazar involved a post-conviction challenge, its
holding appears to have equal application in a direct appeal of
(continued...)
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that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the
basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty. That goal
should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual."
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 11, 22 P.3d 1242. "[A]
[defendant] must show more than a violation of the prophylactic
provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea
was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Salazar, 852 P.2d at
992; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
fl4 We thus review Moa's no-contest plea to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Moa's
plea was knowing and voluntary. In order for a plea to be "truly
voluntary," "the trial court must determine that the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts."
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "[A] court considering such a claim is
not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information
the [defendant] received from his or her attorneys before
entering the plea." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992; see also Visser,
2000 UT 88, f 13 (concluding that the record reflected that rule
11 requirements were fulfilled). Furthermore, because we
consider Moa's appeal under the plain error standard, we must
determine whether "(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful."
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 15, 95 P.3d 276.
^|15 We agree with Moa that an error occurred because of an
internal inconsistency in both the colloquy and the plea
affidavit. The full elements of the third-degree felony to which
Moa was pleading were not referenced or clarified anywhere in the
colloquy or plea statement. Furthermore, the elements and
factual basis in the plea affidavit and the colloquy were those
of a class B misdemeanor, not a felony. Moa's statement that his
counsel had told him about the elements of the crime does not
obviate this error because there is no evidence that these
discussions included the intent to intimidate or harass another.
Further, the error should have been obvious to both the court and
counsel because the statute was unambiguous.
fl6 The question of whether the error was harmful is more
difficult. Under plain error analysis, if obvious and plain
error is established, a defendant must demonstrate that the error
was "of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of

2.
( . . .continued)
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea.
In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, ^ 22-23, 173 P.3d 1279; State v.
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, % 21 n.9.
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a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id. f 22 (internal
quotation marks omitted). To wit, a defendant must show "that
'but for' the alleged error, he or she would not have pled
guilty." Id. In reviewing Moa's motion to withdraw, we
"consider the facts and circumstances in which the plea was
taken." Id. f 12; see also Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 13 (involving a
mid-trial plea). While it is true that the elements of the crime
were erroneously stated, both the plea colloquy and plea
affidavit support the conclusion that Moa clearly knew his plea
was to a felony and also knew the potential sentence was three to
five years. Moa admitted to firing a gun at a building
intentionally and knowingly, though he never admitted to an
intention to harass or intimidate. Further, Garcia had
approached the prosecution and negotiated an agreement that the
underlying sentence would be changed from zero-to-five years to
three-to-five years, and Moa would agree to a PSI before
sentencing in exchange for the State's agreement that Moa could
be released that day and that it would not file any "related
charges." Moa was particularly anxious that he did not have to
be incarcerated and would be released immediately. Garcia
discussed these changes with Moa and Moa agreed to them.
%11 We recognize that a defendant's understanding and knowledge
of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading no contest
is an important part of the process. Nevertheless, we conclude
that Moa has not established that he would have refused to enter
his plea if he had been informed correctly of the elements and
thus has not shown that the error "actually affected the outcome
of the plea process," Dean, 2004 UT 63, *h 23 (internal quotation
marks omitted), which is the essence of his burden when
proceeding on a theory of plain error.3 Therefore, Moa is not
entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine.4

3. We recently released our opinion in State v. Alexander, 2009
UT App 188, which also addresses the trial court's failure to
apprise a defendant of the elements of his claim. See id. ^ 1.
That case is distinguishable because Alexander's claim was not
advanced under the plain error doctrine. Here, Moa must
establish that the trial court's error was not harmless.
Alexander, on the other hand, simply had to demonstrate that the
plea was not knowing and voluntary. See id. 1f 14.
4. Given our disposition on this issue, we need not address
Moa's ineffective assistance of counsel argument because it also
requires a showing of prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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II.

Consecutive Rather Than Concurrent Sentences

1(18 Next, Moa argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering the sentences in case #4352 and case #3971 to run
consecutively. In determining whether sentences should run
consecutively or concurrently, "the court shall consider the
gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2008). We review the
trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, which "results
when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or
if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (footnotes and internal quotation
marks omitted).
fl9 Moa argues that the trial court's decision to impose
consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. Specifically,
Moa challenges two statements made by the prosecutor during the
sentencing hearing, arguing that the trial court may have relied
on those statements. First, Moa complains that the trial court
improperly relied on the prosecutor's statement that the "whole
neighborhood" was a victim of the offenses. Moa also complains
that the prosecutor referenced earlier incidents for which Moa
was not charged. Specifically, during the sentencing hearing,
the prosecutor stated:
[T]here was a murder in front of that home in
February. One of the bullets went into the
. . . home and hit a young girl in the
head. . . .
It didn't kill her, luckily.
[Moa] gets released from custody. Within two
days, there's a shooting again at this home.
Neighbors come out, there's some witnesses,
not enough to put together a case but police
are looking for [Moa]. And then in a few
more days, there's another shooting.
Moa asserts that the trial court erred in considering these
statements because it failed to limit its consideration to the
actual number of victims and there is no indication in the record
that he was charged with or convicted of the incidents described.
^[20 Moa's argument fails because the record does not support his
claim that the trial court actually relied on either of the
prosecutor's statements. " [T]he burden is on [the defendant] to
show that the trial court did not properly consider all the
factors in section 76-3-401(4)." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,
U 16, 40 P.3d 626. Moa has not shown that the trial court
actually relied on these statements; indeed, the trial court said
little about which statutory factors it was considering, and it
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is not required to. See State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, ^ 8,
194 P.3d 195 (stating trial court need not state to what extent
it considered each of the statutory factors at the sentencing
hearing). The trial court said only that it considered Moa "an
extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." Moa
speculates that this statement is connected to the prosecutor's
statements, but in fact, the record does not support this
speculation. To the contrary, the record supports the trial
court's assessment, and the trial court acted within its
discretion by weighing each individual factor as it chose. See
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on
the opposite [side of the] scale."). Again, Moa has not
presented evidence that would indicate that the trial court
abused its discretion in weighing the given factors.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering Moa's sentences to run consecutively
rather than concurrently.

CONCLUSION
f21 We conclude that Moa has not demonstrated any prejudicial
plain error regarding the trial court's acceptance of Moa's nocontest plea: Moa has demonstrated that there was error in the
taking of his no-contest plea, and that the error was obvious,
but he has failed to show that the error was harmful. Thus, Moa
is not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. We
also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in running Moa's sentences consecutively rather than
concurrently. We affirm.
/^C^rUt^OC^

/•

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 20090882-SC

v.
Charles Moa,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on October 26, 2009.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues.

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner
failed to demonstrate plain error in the acceptance of his guilty
plea as to district court case number 031903971.

2.
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district
court's imposition of consecutive sentencing.

A briefing schedule will be established hereafter.
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Addendum C

§ 76-3-401 (West 2004) Concurrent or consecutive sentences —Limitations—Definition
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and
commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order
of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection
(6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6) (a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing

court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that
consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13,
§ 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. May 5,1997; Laws
1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July 1, 2002.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided:
"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence
that they shall run consecutively.
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later

offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
"(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall run
consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe
that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on parole for the
earlier offense, the board shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the
request, the court shall enter an amended order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
"(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences.
"(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
"(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection
(6)(b).
"(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
"(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
"(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
"(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) (a) applies if a defendant:
"(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
"(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
"(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
"(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that

shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
"(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
"(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
"(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the
greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences are equal and
concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
"(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
"(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
"(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located."

§ 76-10-508 (West 2004) Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in
direction of any person, building, or vehicle — Penalties
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm:
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle;
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway;
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state;
(iv) at any communications equipment or property of public utilities including facilities, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or distribution;
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal;
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic sites, overlooks, golf
courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous weapon from the owner or
person in charge of the property within 600 feet of:
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed, including a barn, poultry
yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard.
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the person being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in charge of the property at the time
in question.
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the actor
discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances not amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a third degree felony
and the convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three
years in prison:
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, knowing or
having reason to believe that any person may be endangered;
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in the direction
of any building; or
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a firearm in the direction of any vehicle.
(3) This section does not apply to a person:
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful defense of self or
others; or
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 76-10-523 and
as otherwise provided by law.

§ 77-13-6 (West 2004) Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and
a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act,
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

